The Larger Context For Ramirez's Option

(Or, How The Cubs Gambled For A Pennant By 2006 And Lost)



My friends have returned to Chicago, exhausted and contented by the Austin City Limits music festival here in Austin, and as I sit this evening finally recovered from the blitzkrieg pace of music enjoyment, and watching the Phillies mop up the field with the Cubs pitchers.



It seems to me that a lot of the buzz in Cubs Nation these days that isn’t about Rich Hill surrounds Aramis Ramirez, who has had one of the finest second-halves of anyone in baseball. KJM pointed out to me a quote where, after Aramis’s 7-RBI game, Dusty Baker said, “And, boy, it came right on time for us.” Which made absolutely no sense given that the Cubs have the worst record in the NL with less than two weeks to go, and moreover inasmuch as it probably means Ramirez will be more expensive to retain if he exercises his option. Whatever you say about Ramirez’s outstanding hitting this September in particular, timely is not the adjective to use.

Another friend of mine sent over a a link to a column on 1060west capturing a lot of the sentiment pretty much perfectly, which is that there’s a good chance the Cubs will lose Ramirez to free agency, and that really sucks because he’s been awesome.

It all makes sense: I agree that if you look at it in the context of the moment, it looks like the Cubs have screwed themselves with that contract clause. But to me, the appropriate context is a few years longer. In the two offseasons prior to the start of the 2004 season, I thought that everything the Cubs did pointed towards a strategy that gave them 3 years to succeed, ending in 2006. Going into 2004, they rolled the dice for the first of three chances. And they crapped out, all three seasons.

At that point, pre-2004, Ramirez was not yet the hitter he is -- and especially not the defender he is now. He was showing signs, but it wasn’t until after 2004 that it made sense to give him the big contract. So they did the right thing, I thought, by giving him a one-year deal before 2005 to avoid arbitration to get him on board, and then extend him a few months later with the big and potentially long contract.

All of that comes in the context of what the Cubs were already doing, which was to give the team a chance to win by 2006. Ramirez’s opt-out clause was given at the start of 2005 with his extension. The resulting predicament from which the Cubs now -- rather unsurprisingly -- find themselves, is only the last part of the plan to fizzle as 2006 winds down with the club in last place.

The 2006 strategy covered -- at the time of its inception, going into 2004 -- the most important pieces, the core of the ballclub. It included all the guys with big talent and big contracts except Ramirez, whose contract from Pittsburgh ran through 2004. It included Kerry Wood, whose contract expires. It included Sammy Sosa, for whom the Cubs had an option for 2006. It included Greg Maddux, whose contract expires. It included Derrek Lee, whose original contract was through 2006. The only major players not set up to be cut loose if necessary by 2007 were Carlos Zambrano and Mark Prior, who haven’t put in enough years yet, and can become free agents after 2007 (and who, incidentally, had much smaller contracts, especially since neither had filed for arbitration yet). Going in to 2004, all the big guns were secured through at least 2006, but not farther except for the cheap young guys. Ramirez was (we thought) the wild card that could be decided upon depending on what he did in ’04.

Not least of all, and perhaps most of all, the 2006 strategy included Dusty Baker, who was signed through 2006.

Seen in a larger light, how it looked for the Cubs' prospects through 2006 before the ’04 season, and still looked going into ’05, I suppose the idea behind the opt-out clause was that if the Cubs were a winning club, they would have the money and other incentives, like being a part of a winner with other winning teammates, to keep Ramirez on board. If they weren’t, then he would be one of the pieces that could go as the program expired and the next strategy began. When they extended him before 2005, it was not even unreasonable to assume that if the Cubs were not yet successful by 2006, Ramirez’s (presumably) unexceptional performance -- which isn’t to say bad, just not this good -- could be part of the reason why, and in that case he would not be likely to exercise his option. What they did not see -- and arguably, could not have seen -- was that Ramirez would happen to be the only key player from the start of 2004 besides Carlos Zambrano to produce in 2006.

At the time, going in to 2004, I thought the 3-year strategy was a good one. I thought they were investing the money in the right guys, guys who had a good chance to win a pennant by 2006. At the end of 2004, I still thought the strategy was alright, and that they had a chance to win a pennant in 2005, although the bullpen was obviously a problem, and Sosa was no longer part of the picture. By the end of 2005, I was more skeptical but willing to wait and see how 2006 played out, hoping for health of Wood and Prior, and Ramirez and Lee anchoring the lineup. I had signed on for the 2006 strategy, and so I was willing to see it through.

Not that the Cubs haven’t made moves since that looked past 2006, some of which made sense. It made absolute sense to extend Derrek Lee this year rather than let it play out, as well as to sign Juan Pierre for ‘06. Hopefully they can re-sign Juan Pierre and extend Zambrano, and keep them as part of the plan for ’09 (or so). Extending Dempster was fine by me. Howry and Eyre have been dazzling, and will be around next year. I’m fine with Barrett through 2007. Prior? Who knows? But especially by extending Lee, and knowing Zambrano is around for at least one more year, the 2006 strategy was still augmented in such a way that 2007 would at least have two major pieces to allow for rebuilding if the 2006 strategy fell through in its final season, as it most resoundingly has.

Still, all the big stuff was keyed around the core producing in either 2004, 2005, or 2006, and in that context, Ramirez’s opt-out clause given after he proved himself part of the core after 2004 made at least some sense.

I guess I’m committed to saying that if I thought the 3-year strategy was a great one going in to 2004, and still a good one going in to 2005, and not totally failed going in to 2006, it would be unfair to say it was a bad one solely for the reason that it has turned out abysmally. For that reason, I’m less upset about Ramirez’s opt out clause than most people seem to be. I want to see the Cubs keep him as much as anybody -- especially because of how infrequently he strikes out for someone who slugs like he does -- but that was the gamble they took, and it was in a much bigger context than just Ramirez’s contract. I can take gambling and losing more than flat out bad decision-making, and perhaps this was more of the former than the latter.

Now, one can certainly take the position that the Cubs can afford to carry several big contracts at all times, and so for them to set it up in such a way that a great deal of money would be free after a single season is unnecessary and even inappropriate. Or maybe that a smarter person would have seen that the 2006 strategy was doomed long before the ’06 season started, or even before the ’05 season started, and adjusted course. Or that Ramirez was definitely the kind of player who would deserve a big-time multi-year contract with extra compensation but no options. These are all fine points to make.

On the other hand, I’m still of the mindset that most MLB teams adjust course too soon, and I kind of like that the Cubs are -- or were, and may be again -- a team that had in mind a several-year plan. It helps keep them from being saddled with contracts too long, like Sosa’s and Wood’s it turns out. Guys like those, at the time they get big contracts, want and probably deserve multi-year deals, so to align a handful of them to expire or potentially expire at the same time gives you some extra agility. It’s playing the odds: of the five or six major contracts a team like the Cubs should carry, there is a decent chance that one or two or three guys will end up a relative bust, and this lets you re-up with only the guys who deserve it.

All of that is to say that Ramirez deserves a contract extension, at the fair market value or maybe even a bit more as we expect him to approach his prime, much more than he stands to make if he doesn’t exercise his option, and I hope he gets it from the Cubs. But if he doesn’t, that was a casualty of the three-year strategy the Cubs adopted in the wake of 2003, and held onto after 2004. I suppose it will end up one of those “seemed like a good idea at the time” stories in retrospect.

But I’d be a hypocrite if I didn’t admit that it seemed like a good idea at the time to me as well, not just to the organization.